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Abstract
In this PhD thesis, we apply several mathematical concepts to sciences,
like, Finances, Hydrology, Energy and Psychology. We analyze real data of
different areas and develop techniques of Dynamical Systems, Statistics and
Game Theory to study the data. We, also, build mathematical theoretical
models suitable to investigate the decisions/behavior of an individual by
establishing an analogy to a psychological theory.
In chapter 1, we do an introduction mentioning the main scientific con-
tributions presented in this thesis.
In chapter 2, we exploit ideas of nonlinear dynamics and statistical
physics in a complex non-deterministic dynamical setting using the Ruelle-
Takens embedding. We present some new insights on the quality of the
prediction in the laminar regime and we exhibit the data collapse of the
predicted relative first difference fluctuations to the universal BHP distri-
bution. We observe that the nearest neighbor method of prediction acts as
a filter that does not eliminate the randomness, but exhibits its universal
character.
In chapter 3, we consider the α re-scaled Ip index positive returns r(t)
α
and negative returns (−r(t))α that we call, after normalization, the α pos-
vi
itive fluctuations and α negative fluctuations. We use the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistical test, as a method, to find the values of α that optimize
the data collapse of the histogram of the α fluctuations with the truncated
Bramwell-Holdsworth-Pinton (BHP) probability density function (pdf). Us-
ing the optimal α′s we compute the analytical approximations of the pdf of
the normalized positive and negative Ip index returns r(t), with periodicity
p. The main indices Ip that we study are the PSI-20 and the Dow Jones
Industrial Average but we extend our analysis to world wide indices. The
periodicity p varies from daily (d), weekly (w) and monthly (m) returns to
intraday data (60 min, 30 min, 15 min and 5 min). We also compute the
analytical approximations of the pdf of the normalized positive and nega-
tive spot daily prices or daily returns r(t) of distinct energy sources ES and
exchange rates ER. Since the BHP probability density function appears in
several other dissimilar phenomena, our results reveal a universal feature of
the stock market exchange.
In chapter 4, we construct a model, using Game Theory, for the Theory
of Planned Behavior and we propose the Bayesian-Nash Equilibria as one
of many possible mechanisms to transform human intentions into behavior
decisions. We show that saturation can lead to the adoption of a variety of
different behavior decisions, as opposed to no saturation, which leads to the
adoption of a single consistent behavior decision. Furthermore, we use the
new game theoretical model to understand the impact of the leaders and of
their characteristics in the decision-making of other individuals or groups.
We also apply the model to a students success example, describing Nash
equilibria and “herding” effects, identifying a hysteresis in the process.
Resumo
Nesta tese, aplicamos diversos conceitos matema´ticos em cieˆncias, como,
Financ¸as, Hidrologia, Energia e Psicologia. Analisamos dados reais de dife-
rentes a´reas e desenvolvemos te´cnicas de Sistemas Dinaˆmicos, Estat´ıstica e
Teoria dos Jogos para estudar esses dados. Constru´ımos, tambe´m, modelos
matema´ticos teo´ricos adequados para analisar deciso˜es ou comportamentos
de indiv´ıduos, estabelecendo uma analogia com uma teoria da Psicologia.
No cap´ıtulo 1, efectuamos uma introduc¸a˜o na qual mencionamos as prin-
cipais contribuic¸o˜es cient´ıficas apresentadas nesta tese.
No cap´ıtulo 2, exploramos ideias de dinaˆmica na˜o-linear e f´ısica es-
tat´ıstica, num contexto dinaˆmico complexo na˜o determin´ıstico, usando o
me´todo de reconstruc¸a˜o de Ruelle-Takens. Apresentamos novas percepc¸o˜es
sobre a qualidade da previsa˜o no regime laminar e exibimos a sobreposic¸a˜o
do histograma da primeira diferenc¸a prevista das flutuac¸o˜es com o da dis-
tribuic¸a˜o universal BHP. Observamos que o me´todo do vizinho mais pro´ximo
da previsa˜o actua como um filtro que na˜o elimina a aleatoriedade, mas ev-
idencia a sua universalidade.
No cap´ıtulo 3, consideramos os retornos re-escalados positivos r(t)α e os
retornos re-escalados negativos (−r(t))α, do ı´ndice Ip, que chamamos, apo´s
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a normalizac¸a˜o, flutuac¸o˜es α positivas e flutuac¸o˜es α negativas. Usamos o
teste estat´ıstico Kolmogorov-Smirnov, como um me´todo para encontrar os
valores de α que optimizam a sobreposic¸a˜o do histograma das flutuac¸o˜es α
com o da func¸a˜o densidade de probabilidade Bramwell-Holdsworth-Pinton
(BHP) truncada. Usando os valores o´ptimos de α calculamos uma aproxi-
mac¸a˜o anal´ıtica das func¸o˜es densidade de probabilidade dos retornos r(t)
positivos e negativos normalizados do ı´ndice IP , com periodicidade p. Os
principais ı´ndices IP que estudamos sa˜o o PSI-20 e o Dow Jones, alargando
o nosso estudo a outros ı´ndices mundiais. A periodicidade p varia desde
per´ıodos de 5 minutos ate´ per´ıodos mensais (m). Estudamos, tambe´m,
diferentes fontes de energia ES e taxas de caˆmbio ER. Dado que a func¸a˜o
densidade de probabilidade BHP aparece em va´rios outros feno´menos di-
ferentes, os nossos resultados revelam um cara´cter universal do mercado
bolsista.
No cap´ıtulo 4, constru´ımos um modelo, usando conceitos de Teoria de
Jogos, para a Teoria do Comportamento Planeado e propomos o equilibrio
Bayesian-Nash como um, dos muitos, mecanismos poss´ıveis de transformar
intenc¸o˜es em deciso˜es comportamentais. Mostramos que a saturac¸a˜o pode
levar a` adopc¸a˜o de uma variedade de diferentes deciso˜es comportamentais,
em oposic¸a˜o a` na˜o-saturac¸a˜o que conduz a` adopc¸a˜o de uma decisa˜o com-
portamental consistente. Ale´m disso, utilizamos este modelo de teoria de
jogos para compreender o impacto dos l´ıderes e das suas caracter´ısticas na
tomada de decisa˜o de outros indiv´ıduos ou grupos. Aplicamos, tambe´m, o
modelo a um exemplo de sucesso de estudantes, descrevendo os equilibrios
de Nash e efeitos de ”rebanho”, identificando uma histerese no processo.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This PhD Thesis is the result of different research projects where several
mathematical concepts of Dynamical Systems, Statistics and Game Theory
are applied to sciences, like, Finances, Hydrology, Energy and Psychology.
The probability density function (pdf) of a global measure in a large
class of highly correlated systems has been suggested to be of the same
functional form. Here, we identify the analytical form of the pdf of one
such measure, the magnetic order parameter in the low temperature phase
(critical) of the 2D XY model using a quadratic (spi-wave) approximation.
We present strong evidence that this pdf describes the fluctuations of global
quantities in other correlated systems.
The application of dynamical systems methods (see [22, 55]) found a
firm ground on the reconstruction theorem of Ruelle-Takens [66] and in the
probabilistic justification due to Sauer, Yorke and Casdagli [64]. We pretend
to develop some new insights between the quality of the prediction, the
embedding dimension [43] and the number of nearest neighbors considered
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for river data and stock market data. In particular, our aim is to study the
collapse of the data to the universal BHP distribution.
We also create mathematical theoretical models, using Game Theory
concepts, suitable to investigate the decisions/behavior of an individual by
establishing an analogy to a psychological theory.
Universality in nonlinear prediction of com-
plex systems
A direct link between the real world and deterministic dynamical systems
theory is given by the analysis of real systems time series in terms of non-
linear dynamics with noise (see [40, 42, 58]). Advances have been made
to exploit ideas of dynamical systems theory in cases where the system is
not necessarily deterministic, but it displays a structure not captured by
classical stochastic methods. Here, the real system time series is the daily
runoff of the river Paiva. The time series of the daily runoff reveals that
the daily runoff is an intermittent dynamical system, this intermittent dy-
namical behavior is characterized by a laminar and an irregular phase. The
laminar phase occurs in the absence of rainfall and the irregular phase oc-
curs under the action of rain (see [41, 47, 60, 61]). Hence, the forcing of
the dynamical system is not of a deterministic type (see [34, 35]). Our goal
is to built a Markov process for the laminar regime that models the runoff
stochastic process and that can be useful to do one step ahead prediction.
To built the Markov process for the laminar regime, we start by introduc-
21
ing a modified version of the usual nonlinear prediction methods based in
the Ruelle-Takens embedding (see [39, 61]). After a careful study of the
reconstruction vectors sets taking into account the Ruelle-Takens embed-
ding dimension, we find that a one-dimensional Ruelle-Takens embedding
already gives good prediction results. We also study the improvement of
the prediction results with the increase of the Ruelle-Takens embedding di-
mensions. Since the one-dimensional Ruelle-Takens embedding gives good
predictability results, we built a first order Markov process for the lami-
nar regime. Given the present day runoff value, we find the data collapse
of the histogram of the predicted relative first difference fluctuations, that
determine the transition probabilities of the first order Markov process, to
the universal BHP pdf. Hence, we link the predicted relative first difference
fluctuations in a prediction method for a natural and complex dynamical
system, based in the Ruelle-Takens embedding, with the universal BHP pdf
(see [32, 56]).
Universality in the Stock Market Exchange
Modeling the time series of stock prices is important in economics, finance
and energy market, and it is essential in the management of large stock port-
folios (see [6, 8, 9, 14, 16, 17, 23, 38, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 59]). Here, we
analyze specifically the well known Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)
index (see [30]) and compare it to the S&P 100 (see [25]), the NASDAQ
Composite, the S&P 500 index, and the Russell 2000 index, that corre-
spond to the most closely-watched benchmark indices in terms of stock
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market activity. We extend your study to European indices, in particular
the Portuguese PSI20 (see [29, 56]) and world wide indices.
Let Y (t) be the index Ip adjusted close value at day t. We define the Ip
index return on day t by
r(t) =
Y (t)− Y (t− 1)
Y (t− 1)
We define the α re-scaled Ip index positive returns r(t)
α, for r(t) > 0, that
we call, after normalization, the α positive fluctuations. We define the α
re-scaled Ip index negative returns (−r(t))
α, for r(t) < 0, that we call, after
normalization, the α negative fluctuations.
We analyze, separately, the α positive and α negative fluctuations that
can have different statistical and economic natures (see, for example, [6,
8, 42, 44, 49]). Our aim is to find the values of α that optimize the data
collapse of the histogram of the α positive and α negative fluctuations to
to the Bramwell-Holdsworth-Pinton (truncated BHP) probability density
function (pdf) truncated to the support range of the data (see chapter 2
and Bramwell et al [11]). Our approach is to apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(K-S) statistic test as a method to find the values of α that optimize the
data collapse. Using this data collapse we do a change of variable that allows
us to compute the analytical approximations of the pdf of the normalized
positive and negative Ip index returns
fBHP,Ip,+(x) = A1x
−(1−α+
BHP
)fBHP (B1x
α+
BHP − C1)
fBHP,Ip,−(x) = A2x
−(1−α−
BHP
)fBHP (B2x
α−
BHP − C2)
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in terms of the BHP pdf fBHP . We exhibit the data collapse of the his-
togram of the positive and negative returns to our proposed theoretical pdf´s
fBHP,Ip,+ and fBHP,Ip,−. We also extend our study to energy sources prices
ES and exchange rates ER, obtaining similar results (see [27, 29, 30, 36]).
Since the BHP probability density function appears in several other dis-
similar phenomena (see, for example, [18, 24, 32, 33, 36, 57]), our results
reveal a universal feature of the stock market exchange. Furthermore, these
results lead to the construction of a new qualitative and quantitative econo-
physics model for the stock market based on the two-dimensional spin model
(2dXY) at criticality (see [31]) and to a new stochastic differential equation
model for the stock exchange market indices (see [53]) that provides a better
understanding of several stock exchange crises (see [54]).
Modeling Human Decisions
The main goal in the study of Planned Behavior or Reasoned Action theory
(see [1, 7]) is to understand and predict how individuals turn intentions into
behaviors. We construct a general model for the Theory of Planned Behav-
ior or Reasoned Action, inspired by the works of J. Cownley and M. Wooders
[15], where specific characteristics of individuals, defined as taste type and
crowding type are considered. The crowding type of an individual deter-
mines his influence on the welfare (utility) function of the other individuals.
The taste type determines the characteristics of an individual specifying
his welfare function taking in account the decisions of the other individu-
als. We start by constructing a model, that we call the platonic idealized
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psychological model, which consists of individuals with no uncertainties in
their taste and crowding types and welfare function. Then we construct the
general model, that we call the cave psychological model, which consists of
individuals whose taste and crowding types follow the shadows of the taste
and crowding types of the platonic idealized psychological model, according
to a given probability distribution. Furthermore, in the cave psychological
model, individuals know only the expected value of their welfare function.
In both models, we present sufficient conditions for an individual or group
to adopt a certain behavior decision according to both the Nash and the
Bayesian-Nash Equilibria, i.e. the best strategic individual decision taking
into account the collective response. We show how saturation, boredom and
frustration can lead to different behavior decisions and how no saturation
can lead to a single consistent behavior decision. Following the works of
J. Driskel, E. Salas and R. Sternberg [20, 21, 65] on leadership, we use the
new game theoretical model to understand the impact of the leaders in the
decision-making of individuals or groups. We study how the characteris-
tics of the leaders have an influence over the others’ decisions (see [3, 5]).
We apply the model to a students success example and we describe Nash
equilibria and “herding” effects, identifying a hysteresis in the process.
Chapter 2
Universality in nonlinear
prediction of complex systems
We exploit ideas of nonlinear dynamics and statistical physics in a complex
non-deterministic dynamical setting using the Ruelle-Takens embedding.
We present some new insights on the quality of the prediction in the lam-
inar regime and we exhibit the data collapse of the predicted relative first
difference fluctuations to the universal BHP distribution. We observe that
the nearest neighbor method of prediction acts as a filter that does not
eliminate the randomness, but exhibits its universal character.
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2.1 Universality of the Bramwell-Hodsworth-
Pinton distribution
The universal nonparametric BHP pdf was discovered by Bramwell, Holds-
worth and Pinton [12]. The universal nonparametric BHP pdf is the pdf
of the fluctuations of the total magnetization, in the strong coupling (low
temperature) regime for a two-dimensional spin model (2dXY), using the
spin wave approximation (see [11]). The magnetization distribution, that
they found, is named, after them, the Bramwell-Holdsworth-Pinton (BHP)
distribution. The BHP probability density function (pdf) is given by
p(µ) =
∫ ∞
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dx
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where the {λk}
L
k=1 are the eigenvalues, as determined in [11], of the ad-
jacency matrix. It follows, from the formula of the BHP pdf, that the
asymptotic values for large deviations, below and above the mean, are ex-
ponential and double exponential, respectively (in this work, we use the
approximation of the BHP pdf obtained by taking L = 10 and N = L2
in equation (2.1)). As one can see, the BHP distribution does not have
any parameter (except the mean that is normalized to 0 and the standard
deviation that is normalized to 1). Furthermore, the BHP distribution
is universal in the sense that appears in several physical phenomena (see
[29, 63]). For instance, the universal nonparametric BHP distribution is a
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good model to explain the fluctuations of order parameters in theoretical
examples such as the Sneppen model (see [12, 19]), auto-ignition fire mod-
els (see [62]), self-organized models, and percolation models (see [12]). The
universal nonparametric BHP distribution is, also, an explanatory model
for fluctuations of several phenomenon such as width power in steady state
systems (see [12]), plasma density and electrostatic turbulent fluxes mea-
sured at the scrape-off layer of the Alcator C-Mod Tokamak (see [51]), the
Wolf’s sunspot numbers (see [26, 33]) and the stock exchange’s indices, daily
returns of stocks and commodities (see [25, 27, 29, 30, 36]). The universal
BHP distribution also appears in river heights and flow (see [10, 19, 24, 32]).
However, the approaches used to study the deseasonalised Danube height
data (see [13]) and the Mississippi runoff fluctuations (see [19]) to find the
universal distribution BHP in these dynamical systems do not give a sim-
ilar result in river Paiva due to its different character (see [37]). In this
chapter, we show the re-appearance of the BHP pdf as an approximation of
the distribution of the predicted relative first difference of the river Paiva
runoff.
2.2 Data and preliminary analysis
The most relevant data for this chapter consist of the time series of mean
daily runoff of the river Paiva, measured at Fragas da Torre in the North
of Portugal. The data is available for download in the Instituto Nacional
da A´gua webpage1. The sample period runs from 1st of October of 1946 to
1http://www.inag.pt
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30th of September of 2006 for a total of 21900 observations (see chronogram
of Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Chronogram of the daily mean riverflow of Paiva measured at
Fragas da Torre 1946-99
The riverflow of Paiva is the closest to a natural flow one might expect.
The river Paiva has a small basin of about 700Km2 and it is not a runoff
intermittent river in the sense that at the referred location and in the 60
years of observation the surface stream never disappeared. The river Paiva
is a mountain river with a rocky bed reacting very fast to rainfall. The river
Paiva basin does not have regulators such as dams or glaciers. The water
of river Paiva is used for public supply in the metropolitan area of Porto.
2.3 Nonlinear prediction
Following Ruelle-Takens [66], we consider the m-dimensional embedding set
Rm = {Xt = (Xt−m+1, · · · , Xt), t = [m, · · · , 21900]} of the runoff data. Our
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goal is to predict the runoff value Xt+1 during the laminar regime (absence
of rain phase). Hence, we filter appropriately the reconstruction vectors
Xt ∈ Rm by considering only those Xt that satisfy the following δ-relative
non-increasing rule Xt+i−1 ≥ Xt+i(1 + δ), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. We call
the reconstruction vectors satisfying the δ-relative non-increasing rule by
laminar reconstruction vectors and we denote by LRm the set
LRm = {Xij : Xij+i−1 ≥ Xt+i(1 + δ), 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
of all laminar reconstruction vectors. We define the regime reconstruction
vectors set D[x0, x1] by
D[x0, x1] = {Xt = (Xt−m+1, · · · , Xt) ∈ LRm : x0 ≤ Xt ≤ x1}
We define the real relative first difference b(t) of the runoff Xt, at time t, by
b(t) =
∇Xt
Xt
,
where ∇Xt = Xt+1 − Xt. We define the real relative first difference mean
bµ[x0, x1], in the regime D[x0, x1], by
bµ[x0, x1] =
1
#D[x0, x1]
∑
Xt∈D[x0,x1]
b(t).
Similarly, we define the relative first difference standard deviation bσ[x0, x1],
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in the regime D[x0, x1], by
bσ[x0, x1] =
√
1
#{D[x0, x1]}
∑
Xt∈D[x0,x1]
b2(t)− (bµ[x0, x1])2.
We denote by ‖Xt‖ the maximum norm of the vectorXt = (Xt−m+1, · · · , Xt).
We define the relative distance rd(Xi,Xj) of two reconstruction vectors Xi
and Xj by
rd(Xi, Xj) =
‖Xi −Xj‖
‖Xi‖
.
We define the neighboring set Nm(x) of x by
Nm(x) = {Xr = (Xr−m+1, · · · , Xr) ∈ LRm : Xr ≤ x}.
In Figure 2.2, we show the curve of the cardinal #N1(x) and #N2(x) of
the neighboring sets N1(x) and N2(x) with embedding dimensions 1 and 2,
respectively.
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Figure 2.2: Plot of #N1(x) and #N2(x)
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For every runoff value Xt, we order the vectors
A1,m(Xt), · · · , A#Nm(x)−1,m(Xt)
in Nm(Xt) by their distance to Xt, i.e. ‖Xt − Aj,m‖ ≤ ‖Xt − Aj+1,m‖. We
define the reconstruction vectors set RVi,m(t) of the runoff value Xt by
RVi,m(t) = {Aj,m(Xt) ∈ Nm(Xt) : j ≤ #Nm(Xt)Pi}
as the collection of the first #Nm(Xt)Pi ordered vectors in Nm(Xt). In table
2.1, we exhibit the values of Pi, for i ∈ {1, · · · , 9}, that we use in this work.
Table 2.1: Percentages Pi of the total number of neighbors
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Pi 0.125 0.25 0.5 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 7.5
We define the predicted relative first difference ai,m(t) of the runoff at
time t by
ai,m(t) =
1
#{RVi,m(t)}
∑
Xr∈RVi,m(t)
∇Xr
Xr
.
We define the predicted relative first difference mean aµi,m[x0, x1], in the
regime Dm[x0, x1], by
aµi,m[x0, x1] =
1
#{ai,m(t) : t ∈ Dm[x0, x1]}
∑
Xt∈Dm[x0,x1]
ai,m(t) (2.2)
We define the predicted relative first difference standard deviation aσi,m[x0, x1],
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in the regime Dm[x0, x1], by
aσi,m[x0, x1] =
√
1
#{Dm[x0, x1]}
∑
Xt∈Dm[x0,x1]
a2i,m(t)− (a
µ
i,m[x0, x1])
2. (2.3)
We define the predicted relative first difference fluctuations afi,m(t), in the
regime Dm[x0, x1], by
afi,m(t) =
ai,m(t)− a
µ
i,m[x0, x1]
aσi,m[x0, x1]
(2.4)
In Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, we observe the data collapse of the histogram
of the predicted relative first difference fluctuations to the BHP pdf, for the
regimes D[0, 3], D[3, 9] and D[9, 30].
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of the fluctuations af1,1(t) with the BHP pdf on top,
for the regime D[0, 3]
The error ci,m(t) is the difference between the real relative first difference
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of the fluctuations af2,1(t) with the BHP pdf on top,
for the regime D[3, 9]
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Figure 2.5: Histogram of the fluctuations af1,1(t) with the BHP pdf on top,
for the regime D[9, 30]
b(t) and the predicted relative first difference ai,m(t), i.e.
ci,m(t) = ai,m(t)− b(t).
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We define the error mean cµi,m[x0, x1], in the regime Dm[x0, x1], by
cµi,m[x0, x1] =
1
#{ci,m(t) : t ∈ Dm[x0, x1]}
∑
Xt∈Dm[x0,x1]
ci,m(t) (2.5)
We define the error standard deviation cσi,m[x0, x1], in the regime Dm[x0, x1],
by
cσi,m[x0, x1] =
√
1
#{Dm[x0, x1]}
∑
Xt∈Dm[x0,x1]
c2i,m(t)− (c
µ
i,m[x0, x1])
2. (2.6)
In Figure 2.6 and 2.7, we present the error mean cµi,m[a, b] and the error
standard deviation cσi,m[a, b] for the regimes [a, b] ∈ {[0, 3], [3, 9], [9, 30]}. We
observe that the values of the error mean cµi,m[a, b] considered are close to 0.
The values of the error standard deviation cσi,m[a, b] decrease, approximately,
to half, when we increase the embedding dimension from 1 to 2. After that
the changes are small except for the regime D[9, 30]. In the regime D[9, 30]
the lack of close neighbors starts to be visible for the values observed for m
equal to 4 and 5.
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Figure 2.6: Error mean cµ1,m[a, b] for m ∈ {1, · · · , 5} and [a, b] ∈
{[0, 3], [3, 9], [9, 30]}
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Figure 2.7: Error standard deviation cσ1,m[a, b] for m ∈ {1, · · · , 5} and
[a, b] ∈ {[0, 3], [3, 9], [9, 30]}
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2.4 Conclusion
A dynamical analysis of the river Paiva data was performed using the Ruelle-
Takens method of dynamical reconstruction. The river Paiva is an intermit-
tent complex dynamical system. We studied the dependence of the nearest
neighbors predictor of the relative first difference on the embedding dimen-
sion and on the relative average distance of the nearest neighbors with re-
spect to the runoff value. The prediction results revealed that it is essential
to know the current runoff to predict future values that lead us to recon-
struct an approximation of the one-dimensional stochastics dynamics of the
runoff. We noticed improvements in prediction when the former runoffs are
used. The mean of the error between the real and predicted values, com-
puted for different regimes and embedding dimensions, gives the correction
of the runoff predictor. The standard deviation of the error between the
real and the predicted values gives an insight for the best predictor. We
observe the data collapse of the histograms of the predicted relative first
difference fluctuations to the universal BHP pdf.
Chapter 3
Universality in the Stock
Market Exchange
In this chapter, we consider the α re-scaled Ip index positive returns r(t)
α
and negative returns (−r(t))α that we call, after normalization, the α pos-
itive fluctuations and α negative fluctuations. We use the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistical test, as a method, to find the values of α that optimize
the data collapse of the histogram of the α fluctuations with the truncated
Bramwell-Holdsworth-Pinton (BHP) probability density function. Using
the optimal α′s we compute the analytical approximations of the pdf of
the normalized positive and negative Ip index returns r(t), with periodicity
p. The main indices Ip that we study are the PSI-20 and the Dow Jones
Industrial Average but we extend our analysis to world wide indices. The
periodicity p varies from daily (d), weekly (w) and monthly (m) returns to
intraday data (60 min, 30 min, 15 min and 5 min). We also compute the
analytical approximations of the pdf of the normalized positive and neg-
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ative spot daily prices or daily returns r(t) of distinct energy sources ES
and of the pdf of the normalized positive and negative spot daily prices or
daily returns r(t) of distinct exchange rates ER. Since the BHP probability
density function appears in several other dissimilar phenomena, our results
reveal a universal feature of the stock market exchange.
3.1 Dow Jones Industrial Average
The Dow Jones Industrial Average, also referred to as the Industrial Average
or the Dow Jones, is one of several stock market indices created by Wall
Street Journal editor and Dow Jones & Company co-founder Charles Dow.
It is an index that shows how 30 large, publicly-owned companies based
in the United States have traded during a standard trading session in the
stock market. In our analysis we investigate the time series of the DJIA
index from October of 1928 to October of 2009, considering, respectively,
daily, weekly and monthly returns as well as intraday values (see [30]).
3.1.1 DJIA index daily returns
Positive DJIA index daily returns
Let T+ be the set of all days t with positive returns, i.e.
T+ = {t : r(t) > 0}.
Let n+ = 10605 be the cardinal of the set T+. The α re-scaled DJIA daily
index positive returns are the returns r(t)α with t ∈ T+. Since the total
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number of observed days is n = 20404, we obtain that n+/n = 0.52. The
mean µ+α of the α re-scaled DJIA daily index positive returns is given by
µ+α =
1
n+
∑
t∈T+
r(t)α (3.1)
The standard deviation σ+α of the α re-scaled DJIA daily index positive
returns is given by
σ+α =
√
1
n+
∑
t∈T+
r(t)2α − (µ+α )
2 (3.2)
We define the α positive fluctuations by
r+α (t) =
r(t)α − µ+α
σ+α
(3.3)
for every t ∈ T+. Hence, the α positive fluctuations are the normalized α
re-scaled DJIA daily index positive returns.
Let L+α be the smallest α positive fluctuation, i.e.
L+α = min
t∈T+
{r+α (t)}.
Let R+α be the largest α positive fluctuation, i.e.
R+α = max
t∈T+
{r+α (t)}.
We denote by Fα,+ the probability distribution of the α positive fluctuations.
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Let the truncated BHP probability distribution FBHP,α,+ be given by
FBHP,α,+(x) =
FBHP (x)
FBHP (R+α )− FBHP (L
+
α )
where FBHP is the BHP probability distribution (see definition in Chapter
2). We apply the K-S statistic test to the null hypothesis claiming that the
probability distributions Fα,+ and FBHP,α,+ are equal. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov P value P+α is plotted in Figure 3.1. Hence, we observe that
α+BHP = 0.45... is the point where the P value P
+
α+
BHP
= 0.055... attains
its maximum. We note that
µ+
α+
BHP
= 0.098..., σ+
α+
BHP
= 0.046..., L+
α+
BHP
= −1.964... and R+
α+
BHP
= 7.266...
It is well-known that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov P value P+α decreases
with the distance
Dα,+ = ‖Fα,+ − FBHP,α,+‖
between Fα,+ and FBHP,α,+. In Figure 3.2, we plot
Dα+
BHP
,+(x) =
∣∣∣Fα+
BHP
,+(x)− FBHP,α+
BHP
,+(x)
∣∣∣
and we observe that Dα+,+(x) attains its maximum value 0.0130 for the
α+BHP positive fluctuations above the mean of the probability distribution.
In Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we show the data collapse of the histogram fα+
BHP
,+
of the α+BHP positive fluctuations to the truncated BHP pdf fBHP,α+
BHP
,+.
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Figure 3.1: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov P value P+α for values of α in the
range [0.3, 0.6], in DJIA.
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42 Universality in the Stock Market Exchange
−4 −2 0 2 4 6−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
r+0.45
ln
(f B
H
P,
0.
45
,+
 )
 
 
ln(f0.45,+)
ln(fBHP,0.45,+)
Figure 3.3: The histogram of the α+BHP positive fluctuations with the trun-
cated BHP pdf fBHP,0.45,+ on top, in the semi-log scale, in DJIA
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Theorem 3.1.1 (DJIA pdf daily index positive returns pdf fDJIAd,+) As-
sume that the probability distribution of the α+BHP positive fluctuations r
+
α+
BHP
(t)
is approximated by FBHP,α+
BHP
,+, the pdf of the DJIA daily index positive re-
turns r(t) is approximated by
fBHP,DJIA,+(x) =
α+BHPx
α+
BHP
−1fBHP
((
xα
+
BHP − µ+
α+
BHP
)
/σ+
α+
BHP
)
σ+
α+
BHP
(
FBHP
(
R+
α+
BHP
)
− FBHP
(
L+
α+
BHP
)) .
Hence, we get
fBHP,DJIA,+(x) = 4.60x
−0.55fBHP (21.86x
0.45 − 2.14).
In Figures 3.5 and 3.6, we show the data collapse of the histogram of
the positive returns to our proposed theoretical pdf fBHP,DJIA,+.
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Figure 3.5: The histogram of the fluctuations of the positive returns with
the pdf fBHP,DJIA,+ on top, in the semi-log scale, in DJIA
Proof.
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Figure 3.6: The histogram of the fluctuations of the positive returns with
the pdf fBHP,DJIA,+ on top, in DJIA
Let X be a positive random variable. Let µα and σα be, respectively,
the mean and standard deviation of the random variable Xα, with α > 0.
Let fY : [L,R]→ R
+ be the smooth pdf of the normalized random variable
Y = (Xα − µα)/σα. We note that
P (X ≤ x) = P
(
Xα − µα
σα
≤
xα − µα
σα
)
= P
(
Y ≤
xα − µα
σα
)
.
Hence,
FX(x) = FY
(
xα − µα
σα
)
.
Therefore,
dFX(x)
dx
=
αxα−1fY ((x
α − µα) /σα)
σα
.
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Negative DJIA index daily returns
Let T− be the set of all days t with negative returns, i.e.
T− = {t : r(t) < 0}.
Let n− = 9713 be the cardinal of the set T−. Since the total number of
observed days is n = 20404, we obtain that n−/n = 0.48. The α re-scaled
DJIA daily index negative returns are the returns (−r(t))α with t ∈ T−.
We note that −r(t) is positive. The mean µ−α of the α re-scaled DJIA daily
index negative returns is given by
µ−α =
1
n−
∑
t∈T−
(−r(t))α (3.4)
The standard deviation σ−α of the α re-scaled DJIA daily index negative
returns is given by
σ−α =
√
1
n−
∑
t∈T−
(−r(t))2α − (µ−α )
2 (3.5)
We define the α negative fluctuations by
r−α (t) =
(−r(t))α − µ−α
σ−α
(3.6)
for every t ∈ T−. Hence, the α negative fluctuations are the normalized α
re-scaled DJIA daily index negative returns.
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Let L−α be the smallest α negative fluctuation, i.e.
L−α = min
t∈T−
{r−α (t)}.
Let R−α be the largest α negative fluctuation, i.e.
R−α = max
t∈T−
{r−α (t)}.
We denote by Fα,− the probability distribution of the α negative fluctuations.
Let the truncated BHP probability distribution FBHP,α,− be given by
FBHP,α,−(x) =
FBHP (x)
FBHP (R−α )− FBHP (L
−
α )
where FBHP is the BHP probability distribution (see definition in Chapter
2). We apply the K-S statistic test to the null hypothesis claiming that the
probability distributions Fα,− and FBHP,α,− are equal. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov P value P−α is plotted in Figure 3.7. Hence, we observe that that
α−BHP = 0.46... is the point where the P value P
−
α−BHP
= 0.147... attains its
maximum. We note that
µ−
α−
BHP
= 0.093..., σ−
α−
BHP
= 0.047..., L−
α−
BHP
= −1.894... and R−
α−
BHP
= 8.797...
It is well-known that the Kolmogorov-Smirnov P value P−α decreases with
the distance
Dα,− = ‖Fα,− − FBHP,α,−‖
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Figure 3.7: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov P value P−α for values of α in the
range [0.3, 0.6], in DJIA.
between Fα,− and FBHP,α,−. In Figure 3.8, we plot
Dα−
BHP
,−(x) =
∣∣∣Fα−
BHP
,−(x)− FBHP,α−
BHP
,−(x)
∣∣∣
and we observe that Dα−
BHP
,−(x) attains its maximum value 0.0116 for the
α−BHP negative fluctuations above the mean of the probability distribution.
In Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10, we show the data collapse of the his-
togram fα−
BHP
,− of the α
−
BHP negative fluctuations to the truncated BHP
pdf fBHP,α−
BHP
,−.
Theorem 3.1.2 (DJIA daily index negative returns pdf fDJIA,−) Assume
that the probability distribution of the α−BHP negative fluctuations r
−
α−
BHP
(t) is
approximated by FBHP,α−
BHP
,−, the pdf of the DJIA daily index (symmetric)
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Figure 3.8: The map D0.46,−(x) = |F0.46,−(x)− FBHP,0.46,−(x)|, in DJIA.
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Figure 3.9: The histogram of the α+BHP negative fluctuations with the trun-
cated BHP pdf fBHP,0.46,− on top, in the semi-log scale, in DJIA.
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Figure 3.10: The histogram of the α+BHP negative fluctuations with the trun-
cated BHP pdf fBHP,0.46,− on top, in DJIA.
negative returns −r(t), with T ∈ T−, is approximated by
fBHP,DJIA,−(x) =
α−BHPx
α−
BHP
1fBHP
((
xα
−
BHP − µ−
α−
BHP
)
/σ−
α−
BHP
)
σ−
α−
BHP
(
FBHP
(
R−
α−
BHP
)
− FBHP
(
L−
α−
BHP
)) .
Hence, we get
fBHP,DJIA,−(x) = 4.95x
−0.54fBHP (21.37x
0.46 − 1.99).
The proof of Theorem 3.1.2 follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.1.1.
In Figures 3.11 and 3.12, we show the data collapse of the histogram of the
negative returns to our proposed theoretical pdf fBHP,DJIA,−.
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Figure 3.11: The histogram of the negative returns with the pdf fBHP,DJIA,−
on top, in the semi-log scale, in DJIA.
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3.1.2 DJIA index daily returns through the decades
We divide the time series of our analysis in 8 distinct time series that corre-
spond to 8 different decades and study each decade using the methodology
described previously. The results are presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and in
Figure 3.13, where we can observe that the values of α+BHP vary between
0.45 and 0.65 and the values of α−BHP vary between 0.36 and 0.59. Both
P+
α+
BHP
and P−
α−
BHP
are higher that 0.01.
Table 3.1: DJIA trough the decades-1
α+BHP α
−
BHP P
+
α+
BHP
P−
α−
BHP
D+
α+
BHP
D−
α−
BHP
1930-1939 0.45 0.45 0.84 0.31 0.017 0.028
1940-1949 0.49 0.36 0.32 0.54 0.027 0.023
1950-1959 0.65 0.48 0.03 0.75 0.039 0.020
1960-1969 0.55 0.50 0.43 0.12 0.024 0.034
1970-1979 0.48 0.59 0.29 0.03 0.028 0.041
1980-1989 0.49 0.53 0.11 0.72 0.033 0.020
1990-1999 0.52 0.52 0.16 0.22 0.031 0.031
2000-2009 0.48 0.51 0.93 0.20 0.015 0.031
Table 3.2: DJIA trough the decades-2
µ+
α+
BHP
µ−
α−
BHP
σ+
α+
BHP
σ−
α−
BHP
1930-1939 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.06
1940-1949 0.07 0.13 0.03 0.05
1950-1959 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.03
1960-1969 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03
1970-1979 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03
1980-1989 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04
1990-1999 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03
2000-2009 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.04
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1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009
ɲн,W 0,45 0,49 0,65 0,55 0,48 0,49 0,52 0,48
ɲ-BHP 0,45 0,36 0,48 0,5 0,59 0,53 0,52 0,51
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
0,70
Figure 3.13: Values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP for each decade, in DJIA.
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3.1.3 DJIA index weekly and monthly returns
We consider the same time series between 1928 and 2009 but with differ-
ent periodicity, respectively, weekly and monthly returns. Using the same
methodology, we obtain the results presented in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and in Figure
3.14.
Table 3.3: DJIA weekly and monthly returns-1
α+BHP α
−
BHP P
+
α+
BHP
P−
α−
BHP
D+
α+
BHP
D−
α−
BHP
weekly 0.56 0.47 0.55 0.59 0.016 0.018
monthly 0.37 0.65 0.94 0.90 0.026 0.024
Table 3.4: DJIA weekly and monthly returns-2
µ+
α+
BHP
µ−
α−
BHP
σ+
α+
BHP
σ−
α−
BHP
weekly 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.07
monthly 0.27 0.10 0.11 0.06
Hence, considering weekly returns, we get
fBHP,DJIAw,+(x) = 6.15x
−0.44fBHP (20.34x
0.56 − 1.85)
fBHP,DJIAw,−(x) = 3.44x
−0.53fBHP (15.37x
0.47 − 2.10)
Considering monthly returns, we get
fBHP,DJIAm,+(x) = 1.36x
−0.63fBHP (8.80x
0.37 − 2.40)
fBHP,DJIAm,−(x) = 6.21x
−0.35fBHP (17.22x
0.65 − 1.80).
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Figure 3.14: Values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP for weekly and monthly returns, in
DJIA.
3.1.4 DJIA intraday returns
We analyze four time series of intraday closure values of DJIA in periods of
60 minutes, 30 minutes, 15 minutes and 5 minutes. We compare the same
number of observations (7000) in all series, studying in fDJIA60m 292 days,
in fDJIA30m 146 days, in fDJIA15m 73 days and in fDJIA5m 24 days.
The values of the parameters are presented in Tables 3.5, 3.6 and in
Figure 3.15, where we can observe that P+
α+
BHP
and P−
α−
BHP
are higher that
0.01 and α+BHP and α
−
BHP vary between 0.36 and 0.45.
3.1 Dow Jones Industrial Average 55
Table 3.5: DJIA intraday returns-1
α+BHP α
−
BHP P
+
α+
BHP
P−
α−
BHP
D+
α+
BHP
D−
α−
BHP
60 min 0.37 0.36 0.18 0.02 0.018 0.026
30 min 0.37 0.40 0.34 0.32 0.016 0.016
15 min 0.44 0.41 0.49 0.58 0.014 0.013
5 min 0.41 0.45 0.24 0.16 0.019 0.021
Table 3.6: DJIA intraday returns-2
µ+
α+
BHP
µ−
α−
BHP
σ+
α+
BHP
σ−
α−
BHP
60 min 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05
30 min 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.04
15 min 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.03
5 min 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
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0,37 0,37
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Figure 3.15: Values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP for intraday returns, in DJIA.
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Considering 60 min returns, we get
fBHP,DJIA60min,+(x) = 3.83x
−0.63fBHP (21.22x
0.37 − 2.05)
fBHP,DJIA60min,−(x) = 3.43x
−0.64fBHP (19.64x
0.36 − 2.06).
Considering 30 min returns, we get
fBHP,DJIA30min,+(x) = 3.78x
−0.63fBHP (22.57x
0.37 − 2.21)
fBHP,DJIA30min,−(x) = 4.83x
−0.60fBHP (24.64x
0.40 − 2.04).
Considering 15 min returns, we get
fBHP,DJIA15min,+(x) = 8.50x
−0.56fBHP (38.95x
0.44 − 2.02)
fBHP,DJIA15min,−(x) = 6.45x
−0.59fBHP (32.96x
0.41 − 2.10).
Considering 5 min returns, we get
fBHP,DJIA5min,+(x) = 9.79x
−0.59fBHP (53.98x
0.41 − 2.26)
fBHP,DJIA5min,−(x) = 14.62x
−0.55fBHP (64.32x
0.45 − 1.98).
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3.2 Dow Jones and other North American
Indices
After making a particular study of the DJIA index, we extend our study
to other North American relevant indices and analyze if the values of the
α+BHP and α
−
BHP are similar.
We consider four time series, the S&P 100 index from January of 1987
to September of 2008 (see [25]), the Nasdaq index from February of 1971 to
January of 2010, the Russell 2000 index from September of 1987 to January
of 2010 and the S&P 500 index from January of 1950 to January of 2010.
Considering daily returns, we obtain the results presented in Figures
3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 3.19 and 3.20.
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Figure 3.16: Values of α+BHP and α−BHP for each index daily returns
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Figure 3.17: Values of P+
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for each index daily returns
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For weekly returns, we obtain the results presented in Figures 3.21, 3.22,
3.23, 3.24 and 3.25.
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Figure 3.21: Values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP for each index weekly returns
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Considering monthly returns, we obtain the results presented in Figures
3.26, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29 and 3.30.
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Figure 3.26: Values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP for each index monthly returns
In all the periodicities, especially in daily returns, we observe that the values
of α+BHP and α
−
BHP are similar in the four indices, and close to 0.50.
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3.3 European Indices
We use the same methodology to study European indices, in particular the
Portuguese index, PSI-20 (see [29, 56]).
3.3.1 PSI-20
The PSI-20 (an acronym of Portuguese Stock Index) is a benchmark stock
market index of companies that trade on Euronext Lisbon, the main stock
exchange of Portugal. The index tracks the prices of the twenty listings
with the largest market capitalization and share turnover in the PSI Geral,
the general stock market of the Lisbon exchange. It is one of the main na-
tional indices of the pan-European stock exchange group Euronext alongside
Brussels (BEL20), Paris (CAC 40) and Amsterdam (AEX).
For the positive PSI-20 index daily returns, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov P
value P+α is plotted in Figure 3.31. We observe that α
+
BHP = 0.48... is the
point where the P value P+
α+
BHP
= 0.95... attains its maximum. In Figure
3.32, we plot
Dα+
BHP
,+(x) =
∣∣∣Fα+
BHP
,+(x)− FBHP,α+
BHP
,+(x)
∣∣∣
and we observe that Dα+
BHP
,+(x) attains its maximum value 0.0151 for the
α+ positive fluctuations below the mean of the probability distribution. In
Figures 3.33 and 3.34, we show the data collapse of the histogram fα+
BHP
,+
of the α+BHP positive fluctuations to the truncated BHP pdf fBHP,α+
BHP
,+.
The pdf of the PSI-20 daily index positive returns r(t) is approximated
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Figure 3.31: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov P value P+α for values of α in the
range [0.3, 0.6], in PSI-20.
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Figure 3.32: The map D0.48,+(x) = |F0.48,+(x)− FBHP,0.48,+(x)|, in PSI-20
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Figure 3.33: The histogram of the α+BHP positive fluctuations with the trun-
cated BHP pdf fBHP,0.48,+ on top, in the semi-log scale, in PSI-20.
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Figure 3.34: The histogram of the α+BHP positive fluctuations with the trun-
cated BHP pdf fBHP,0.48,+ on top, in PSI-20.
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by
fBHP,PSI20,+(x) =
α+BHPx
α+
BHP
−1fBHP
((
xα
+
BHP − µ+
α+
BHP
)
/σ+
α+
BHP
)
σ+
α+
BHP
(
FBHP
(
R+
α+
BHP
)
− FBHP
(
L+
α+
BHP
)) .
Hence, we get
fBHP,PSI20,+(x) = 5.71x
−0.52fBHP (24.3x
0.48 − 2.04).
For negative PSI-20 index daily returns, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov P value
P−α is plotted in Figure 3.35. Hence, we observe that α
−
BHP = 0.46... is the
point where the P value P−
α−
BHP
= 0.77... attains its maximum. In Figure
3.36, we plot
Dα−
BHP
,−(x) =
∣∣∣Fα−
BHP
,−(x)− FBHP,α−
BHP
,−(x)
∣∣∣
and we observe that Dα−
BHP
,−(x) attains its maximum value 0.0202 for the
α−BHP negative fluctuations below the mean of the probability distribution.
In Figures 3.37 and 3.38, we show the data collapse of the histogram fα−
BHP
,−
of the α−BHP negative fluctuations to the truncated BHP pdf fBHP,α−
BHP
,−.
The pdf of the PSI−20 daily index (symmetric) negative returns −r(t),
with T ∈ T−, is approximated by
fBHP,PSI20,−(x) =
α−BHPx
α−
BHP
1fBHP
((
xα
−
BHP − µ−
α−
BHP
)
/σ−
α−
BHP
)
σ−
α−
BHP
(
FBHP
(
R−
α−
BHP
)
− FBHP
(
L−
α−
BHP
)) .
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Figure 3.35: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov P value P−α for values of α in the
range [0.3, 0.6], in PSI-20.
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Figure 3.36: The map D0.46,−(x) = |F0.46,−(x)−FBHP,0.46,−(x)|, in PSI-20.
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Figure 3.37: The histogram of the α−BHP negative fluctuations with the trun-
cated BHP pdf fBHP,0.46,− on top, in the semi-log scale, in PSI-20.
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Figure 3.38: The histogram of the α−BHP negative fluctuations with the trun-
cated BHP pdf fBHP,0.46,− on top, in PSI-20.
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Hence, we get
fBHP,PSI20,−(x) = 4.80x
−0.54fBHP (21.0x
0.46 − 2.0)
3.3.2 Other European Indices
We analyze the time series of the following European indices: from France,
the (FCHI)- CAC 40 index between March of 1990 and September of 2009;
from Germany, the (GDAXI)- DAX index between November of 1990 and
September of 2009; from Italy, the (MIBTEL)- MIBTEL index between
January of 2000 and May of 2009; from Netherlands, the (AEX)- AEX
General index between October of 1992 and September of 2009; from Nor-
way, the (OSEAX)- OSE All Share index between February of 2001 and
September of 2009; from Spain, the (SMSI)-Madrid General index between
June of 2006 and September of 2009; from Sweden, the (OMXSPI)- Stock-
holm General index between January of 2001 and September of 2009; from
Switzerland, the (SSMI)- Swiss Market index between November of 1990
and September of 2009; and from UK, the (FTSE)- FTSE 100 index be-
tween April of 1984 and September of 2009. The results obtained for these
indices are presented in Tables 3.7, 3.8 and in Figure 3.39.
In all the indices, we observe that the values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP are
similar and vary between 0.40 and 0.57 and that P+
α+
BHP
and P−
α−
BHP
are
higher that 0.01, which can indicate universality in European indices.
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Table 3.7: European Indices-1
α+BHP α
−
BHP P
+
α+
BHP
P−
α−
BHP
D+
α+
BHP
D−
α−
BHP
FCHI 0.56 0.53 0.07 0.08 0.026 0.026
DAX 0.50 0.48 0.19 0.24 0.021 0.022
MIBTEL 0.47 0.43 0.83 0.15 0.018 0.034
AEX 0.46 0.43 0.59 0.31 0.016 0.021
OSEAX 0.57 0.47 0.79 0.94 0.019 0.017
SMCI 0.40 0.44 0.90 0.95 0.027 0.026
OMXSPI 0.52 0.50 0.44 0.15 0.026 0.035
SSMI 0.53 0.53 0.22 0.62 0.021 0.016
FTSE 0.55 0.55 0.19 0.14 0.019 0.021
Table 3.8: European Indices-2
µ+
α+
BHP
µ−
α−
BHP
σ+
α+
BHP
σ−
α−
BHP
FCHI 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04
DAX 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.05
MIBTEL 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.06
AEX 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.06
OSEAX 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.05
SMCI 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.06
OMXSPI 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.05
SSMI 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04
FTSE 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03
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Figure 3.39: Values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP in European indices.
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3.4 World Wide Indices
We analyze the time series of the following World wide Indices: from Ar-
gentina, the (MERV) index between October of 1996 and September of
2009; from Brazil, the (BVSP)- Bovespa index between April of 1993 and
September of 2009; from Mexico, the (MXX)- IPC index between Novem-
ber of 1991 and September of 2009; from Japan, the (N225)- Nikkei 225
index between January of 1984 and September of 2009; and from Hong-
Kong, the (HSI)- Hang Seng index between January of 2000 and October
of 2010. The results obtained for these indices are presented in Tables 3.9,
3.10 and in Figure 3.40.
Table 3.9: World Wide Indices-1
α+BHP α
−
BHP P
+
α+
BHP
P−
α−
BHP
D+
α+
BHP
D−
α−
BHP
MERV 0.48 0.46 0.92 0.50 0.016 0.025
BVSP 0.51 0.50 0.29 0.15 0.021 0.027
MXX 0.54 0.53 0.68 0.19 0.015 0.023
N225 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.07 0.015 0.023
HSI 0.48 0.42 0.51 0.12 0.023 0.035
Table 3.10: World Wide Indices-2
µ+
α+
BHP
µ−
α−
BHP
σ+
α+
BHP
σ−
α−
BHP
MERV 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.06
BVSP 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.06
MXX 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04
N225 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.05
HSI 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.06
In all the indices, we observe that α+BHP and α
−
BHP are similar and vary
between 0.42 and 0.54 and that P+
α+
BHP
and P−
α−
BHP
are higher that 0.01.
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Figure 3.40: Values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP in World wide indices.
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3.5 Energy Sources
We consider, in our analysis, several energy sources daily data series that
correspond to periods of time between 6-14 years. We study energy sources
data of two distinct groups: Non-renewable Sources and Renewable Sources
(see [28]). In the first group, we consider oil and petroleum products, namely
crude oil (from January 1986 to January of 2010), heating oil (from June
1986 to January of 2010), gasoline (from June 1986 to January of 2010)
and propane (from May 1992 to January of 2010). In the second group,
we analyze biofuels such as ethanol (from March 2005 to October of 2009)
and biodiesel (from December of 2006 to October of 2009). We also study a
product from which renewable energy is produced, respectively corn (from
February 1998 to October of 2009)
The results obtained for the different energy sources are presented in
Tables 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.14 and in Figures 3.41 and 3.42, respectively.
Table 3.11: Non-renewable Energy Sources Prices-1
α+BHP α
−
BHP P
+
α+
BHP
P−
α−
BHP
D+
α+
BHP
D−
α−
BHP
Crude Oil 0.52 0.51 0.26 0.43 0.018 0.016
Heating Oil 0.52 0.57 0.16 0.70 0.021 0.013
Propane 0.32 0.30 0.64 0.70 0.017 0.017
Gasoline 0.55 0.55 0.13 0.02 0.021 0.029
In the non-renewable energy sources prices, we observe that α+BHP and
α−BHP vary between 0.30 and 0.57.
In the renewable energy sources prices, we observe that α+BHP and α
−
BHP
vary between 0.20 and 0.50.
The results indicate universality in energy sources prices.
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Table 3.12: Non-renewable Energy Sources Prices-2
µ+
α−
BHP
µ−
α−
BHP
σ+
α+
BHP
σ−
α−
BHP
Crude Oil 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.06
Heating Oil 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.05
Propane 0.25 0.28 0.08 0.08
Gasoline 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.05
0,52 0,52
0,32
0,55
0,51
0,54
0,3
0,55
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
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Figure 3.41: Values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP in non-renewable energy sources
prices.
Table 3.13: Renewable Energy Sources and Products-1
α+BHP α
−
BHP P
+
α+
BHP
P−
α+
BHP
D+
α+
BHP
D−
α−
BHP
Ethanol 0.20 0.26 0.02 0.46 0.070 0.034
Biodiesel 0.30 0.50 0.46 0.94 0.064 0.035
Corn 0.41 0.41 0.56 0.25 0.021 0.027
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Table 3.14: Renewable Energy Sources and Products-2
µ+
α+
BHP
µ−
α−
BHP
σ+
α+
BHP
σ−
α−
BHP
Ethanol 0.51 0.40 0.14 0.12
Biodiesel 0.56 0.35 0.16 0.14
Corn 0.16 0.17 0.07 0.07
0,2
0,3
0,41
0,26
0,5
0,41
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
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ɲнBHP ɲ-BHP
Figure 3.42: Values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP in renewable energy sources prices.
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3.6 Exchange Rates
In finance, the exchange rates (also known as the foreign-exchange rate,
forex rate or FX rate) between two currencies specify how much one cur-
rency is worth in terms of the other. It is the value of a foreign nation’s
currency in terms of the home nation’s currency. The foreign exchange mar-
ket is one of the largest markets in the world. We study the daily returns of
the following exchange rates: EURCHF Euro vs. Swiss franc (from March
1979 to January 2010) and EURJPY Euro vs. Japanese yen (from March
1979 to January 2010).
The results obtained for the different exchange rates that we analyzed
are presented in Tables 3.15, 3.16 and in Figure 3.43.
Table 3.15: Exchange Rates-1
α+BHP α
−
BHP P
+
α+
BHP
P−
α+
BHP
D+
α+
BHP
D−
α−
BHP
EUR-CHF 0.38 0.42 0.05 0.02 0.021 0.024
EUR-JPY 0.58 0.52 0.03 0.01 0.023 0.028
Table 3.16: Exchange Rates-2
µ+
α+
BHP
µ−
α−
BHP
σ+
α+
BHP
σ−
α−
BHP
EUR-CHF 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.04
EUR-JPY 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.03
In the studied exchange rates, we observe that α+BHP and α
−
BHP vary between
0.38 and 0.58 and P+
α+
BHP
and P−
α−
BHP
are higher that 0.01, which can indicate
universality in these data series.
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Figure 3.43: Values of α+BHP and α
−
BHP in exchange rates.
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3.7 Conclusion
We used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistical test to compare the histogram
of the α positive fluctuations and α negative fluctuations with the trun-
cated Bramwell-Holdsworth-Pinton (BHP) probability density function. We
found that the parameters α+BHP and α
−
BHP for the positive and negative
fluctuations, respectively, vary mostly around 0.50. The fact that α+BHP
is different from α−BHP can be due to leverage effects. We presented the
data collapse of the corresponding fluctuations histograms to the BHP pdf.
Furthermore, we computed the analytical approximations of the pdf of the
normalized Ip index positive and negative returns in terms of the BHP pdf.
We showed the data collapse of the histogram of the positive and negative
returns to our proposed theoretical pdfs fBHP,Ip,+ and fBHP,Ip,−. We also
computed the analytical approximations of the pdf of the normalized pos-
itive and negative spot daily prices or daily returns r(t) of distinct energy
sources ES and exchange rates ER.
Since the BHP probability density function appears in several other dis-
similar phenomena (see, for example, [18, 24, 32, 33, 36, 57]), our results
reveal a universal feature of the stock market exchange. Furthermore, these
results lead to the construction of a new qualitative and quantitative econo-
physics model for the stock market based on the two-dimensional spin model
(2dXY) at criticality (see [31]) and to a new stochastic differential equation
model for the stock exchange market indices (see [53]) that provides a better
understanding of several stock exchange crises (see [54]).
Chapter 4
Modeling Human Decisions
In this chapter, we construct a model, using Game Theory, for the Theory
of Planned Behavior and we propose the Bayesian-Nash Equilibria as one
of many possible mechanisms to transform human intentions into behavior
decisions. We show that saturation, boredom and frustration can lead to
the adoption of a variety of different behavior decisions, as opposed to no
saturation, which leads to the adoption of a single consistent behavior de-
cision. Furthermore, we use the new game theoretical model to understand
the impact of the leaders in the decision-making of individuals or groups and
we study how the characteristics of the leaders have an influence over the
others’ decisions. We also apply the model to a students success example,
describing Nash equilibria and “herding” effects, identifying a hysteresis in
the process.
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4.1 Theory of Planned Behavior or Reasoned
Action
The Theory of Planned Behavior or Reasoned Action is summarized in Fig-
ure 4.1 (see [1]), where we observe that external variables are divided in three
categories: intrapersonal associated to individual actions; interpersonal as-
sociated to the interaction of the individual with others; and sociocultural
associated to social values. These external variables influence, especially,
the intermediate variables which are also subdivided in three major groups:
social norms, attitude, and self-efficacy. The social norms can be the opin-
ions, conceptions and judgments that others have about a certain behavior;
attitudes are personal opinions in favor or against a specific behavior; and
self-efficacy is the extent of ability to control a certain behavior. These
external and intermediate variables lead to a consequent intention to adopt
a certain behavior.
4.2 Platonic Idealized Psychological World
In the platonic idealized psychological model, inspired in Plato‘s world of
thoughts or of the intelligible reality, the individuals have no uncertainties
in their taste and crowding types and welfare function. We consider that
the individuals are pure in the sense that the external and intermediate
variables of the model are known, to all individuals.
In this model, the individuals will choose a certain behavior/group g ∈
G. Those choices will be done, taking in account their characteristics and
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Figure 4.1: Theory of Planned Behavior
personal preferences (taste type) and the other individuals observable char-
acteristics (crowding club vector). The goal is to present a decision mecha-
nism for the individuals, taking in account their and the others types.
Let us consider a finite number S of individuals. For each individual
s ∈ S, we distinguish two types of characteristics: taste type T : S → T
and crowding type C : S → C. We associate to each individual s ∈ S one
taste type T (s) = t ∈ T that describes the individual’s inner characteristics,
which are not always observable by the other individuals. We also associate
to each individual s ∈ S one crowding type C(s) = c ∈ C that describes the
individual’s characteristics observed by the others and that can influence the
welfare of the others. In accordance with the Theory of Planned Behavior
or Reasoned Action, we associate the intrapersonal external variables and
the attitude and self efficacy intermediate variables with the taste type, and
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the interpersonal and sociocultural external variables and the social norms
intermediate variable with the crowding type.
The individuals, with their own characteristics, can define a strategy
G : S → G, i.e. each individual s ∈ S chooses a behavior/group G(s). Each
strategy G corresponds to an intention in the Theory of Planned Behavior
(see [5]). Given a behavior/group strategy G : S → G, the crowding vector
m(G) ∈ (NC)G is the vector whose components mgc = m
g
c(G) determine the
number of individuals that choose behavior/group g with crowding type
c ∈ C, i.e.
mgc = # {s ∈ S : G (s) = g ∧ C (s) = c} .
We denote by st,c the individual s with taste type t and crowding type c.
We measure the level of welfare, or personal satisfaction, that an individual
st,c acquires by choosing a behavior/group g ∈ G with crowding vector
m = m(G), using a utility function ut,c : G× (N
C)G → R given by
ut,c(g,m) = V
g
t,c +
∑
c′∈C
Ag,c
′
t,c m
g
c′
where V gt,c measures the satisfaction level that each individual st,c has in
choosing a behavior/group g ∈ G, and Ag,c
′
t,c evaluates the satisfaction that
each individual st,c has with the presence of an individual with crowding
type c′ that chooses the same behavior/group g.
The strategy G∗ : S → G is a (pure) Nash Equilibrium behavior/group,
if given the choice options of all individuals, no individual feels motivated
to change his behavior/group choice, i.e. his utility does not increase by
changing his behavior/group decision (see A.A.Pinto [57]).
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The platonic idealized psychological model gives rise to a dictionary
between Game Theory and Theory of Planned Behavior that is summarized
in Figure 4.2 (see Almeida [4, 5]).
Figure 4.2: Theory of Planned Behavior / Platonic idealized psychological
world
We denote by S(t,c) the group of all individuals st,c with the same taste
type t ∈ T and the same crowding type c ∈ C. Let n(t, c) correspond to
the number of individuals in S(t,c).
Remark 1 An interesting way to interpret S(t,c) is to consider that n(t, c)
is the number of times that a single individual st,c has to take an action. In
this case, Ag,ct,c > 0 can be interpreted as the individual positive reward by
repeating the same behavior/group choice g ∈ G, i.e. the individual st,c does
not feel a saturation effect by repeating the same choice. On the other hand,
Ag,ct,c < 0 can be interpreted as the individual negative reward by repeating the
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same behavior/group choice g ∈ G, i.e. the individual st,c feels a saturation,
boredom or frustration effect by repeating the same choice.
4.2.1 Individuals that like to repeat the same behav-
ior (no-saturation)
In this section, we consider the hypothesis that Ag,ct,c > 0. We exploit situ-
ations where no-saturation can lead to the adoption of a single consistent
behavior decision.
Lemma 4.2.1 Let G∗ be a Nash Equilibrium. Let Ag,ct,c > 0, for every g ∈ G,
t ∈ T and c ∈ C. For every taste type t ∈ T and every crowding type
c ∈ C, all the individuals st,c ∈ S(t,c), with the same taste type and the same
crowding type, choose the same behavior/group G∗(st,c) = G
∗(S(t,c)).
Remark 2 If Lemma 4.2.1 holds, considering that n(t, c) represents the
number of times that a same individual st,c has to take an action, one con-
cludes that the individual st,c does not have a negative reward by repeating
the same behavior/group choice and so has a single consistent behavior de-
cision.
Proof. Let us suppose that for a group strategy G : S → G individuals
with same taste type t and same crowding type c choose more than one
behavior/group. Let us denote by g the behavior/group choice where these
individuals st,c attain the highest welfare (does not need to be unique). Then
any individual st,c that chooses another behavior/group g
′ by changing his
choice to the behavior/group g will increase his welfare because Ag,ct,c > 0.
Hence G : S → G is not a Nash Equibrium behavior/group.
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4.2.2 Individuals that choose what they prefer
In this section, we exploit situations where individuals choose the behav-
ior/group that they prefer, independently of the influence of the others.
We define the worst neighbors WNg(t, c) of the individual st,c in choosing
the behavior/group g by
WNg(t, c) = V
g
t,c +
∑
c′∈C,Ag,c
′
t,c <0
Ag,c
′
t,c
∑
t′∈T
n(t′, c′),
where V gt,c represents the valuation of the individual st,c in choosing the
behavior/group g, and
∑
c′∈C,Ag,c
′
t,c <0
Ag,c
′
t,c
∑
t′∈T n(t
′, c′) represents the worst
neighbors that the individual st,c can have for the same choice of behav-
ior/group g.
We define the best neighbors BNg(t, c) of the individual st,c in choosing
the behavior/group g by
BNg(t, c) = V
g
t,c +
∑
c′∈C,Ag,c
′
t,c >0
Ag,c
′
t,c
∑
t′∈T
n(t′, c′),
where V gt,c represents the valuation of the individual st,c in choosing the
behavior/group g and
∑
c′∈C,Ag,c
′
t,c >0
Ag,c
′
t,c
∑
t′∈T n(t
′, c′) represents the best
neighbors that the individual st,c can have for the same choice of behav-
ior/group g.
Let gW = argmax{g∈G}WNg(t, c) andBN(t, c) = max{g∈G:g 6=gW }BNg(t, c).
Lemma 4.2.2 If WNgW (t, c) > BN(t, c) then G
∗(St,c) = gW , for every
Nash Equilibrium G∗.
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We note that there is a value V0 such that Lemma 4.2.2 holds, for all V
gW
t,c >
V0.
Remark 3 If Lemma 4.2.2 holds, considering that n(t, c) represents the
number of times that a same individual st,c has to take an action, one con-
cludes that the individual st,c chooses the same behavior/group gW , indepen-
dently of the Nash Equilibrium behavior/group considered.
Proof. Let us suppose, by contradiction, that G∗ is a Nash equilibrium,
such that, at least one individual st,c chooses the behavior/group g ∈ G \
{gw}. By construction of the best neighbors BN(t, c), the utility function
is bounded above by
ut,c(g,m) ≤ BNg(t, c) ≤ BN(t, c).
If the individual changes his behavior/group choice to gW , then by con-
struction of the worst neighborsWNgW (t, c), the utility function is bounded
below by
ut,c(gW ,m) ≥ WNgW (t, c).
Since WNgW (t, c) > BN(t, c), we get
ut,c(gW ,m) > ut,c(g,m),
which is a contradiction.
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4.2.3 Boredom and Frustration
In this section, we consider the hypothesis that Ag,ct,c < 0. We exploit the
situations where boredom and frustration can lead to the adoption of a
variety of different behavior decisions.
We define the worst lonely neighbors WNLg(t, c) of the individual st,c
in choosing the behavior/group g by
WNLg(t, c) = V
g
t,c + A
g,c
t,c +
∑
c′∈C,c′ 6=c,Ag,c
′
t,c <0
Ag,c
′
t,c
∑
t′∈T
n(t′, c′).
Let g1 = argmax{g∈G}WNLg(t, c) and g2 = argmax{g∈G:g 6=g1}WNLg(t, c).
We define the best lonely neighbors BNL(t, c) of the individual st,c by
BNL(t, c) = max
{g∈G:g1 6=gw 6=g2}
BNg(t, c)
Lemma 4.2.3 Let G∗ be a Nash Equilibrium, Ag1,ct,c < 0 and A
g2,c
t,c < 0. If
BNL(t, c) < WNLg2(t, c)
and
Agi,ct,c n(t, c) + BNgi(t, c) < WNLgj(t, c),
for every i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, then G∗(St,c)∩g1 6= ∅ and G
∗(St,c)∩g2 6= ∅.
Remark 4 If Lemma 4.2.3 holds, considering that n(t, c) represents the
number of times that a same individual st,c has to take an action, one
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concludes that the individual st,c splits his decision, at least, between the
behavior/groups g1 and g2, independently of the pure Nash Equilibrium be-
havior/group considered.
Proof. Let us suppose, by contradiction that G∗ is a Nash Equilibrium,
such that either
a) G∗(St,c) ∩ g1 = ∅ ∧ G
∗(St,c) ∩ g2 = ∅; or
b) G∗(St,c) ∩ g1 6= ∅ ∧ G
∗(St,c) ∩ g2 = ∅; or
c) G∗(St,c) ∩ g1 = ∅ ∧ G
∗(St,c) ∩ g2 6= ∅
In case a), let st,c be an individual that chooses a behavior/group g ∈
G \ {g1, g2}. By construction of the best lonely neighbors BNL(t, c), the
utility function is bounded above by
ut,c(g,m) ≤ BNg(t, c) ≤ BNL(t, c).
If the individual st,c changes his behavior/group choice to g2 (or g1) then, by
construction the worst lonely neighbors WNLg2(t, c), the utility function is
bounded below by
ut,c(g2,m) ≥ WNLg2(t, c).
Since BNL(t, c) < WNLg2(t, c) we get
ut,c(g2,m) > ut,c(g,m),
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which is a contradiction.
In case b), either i) all the individuals choose the behavior group g1
or ii) there is at least one individual st,c that chooses a behavior/group
g ∈ G \ {g1, g2}. Case bii) does not occur and the proof follows similarly to
the proof of case a). In case bi), by construction of Ag1,ct,c n(t, c) and of the
best neighbors BNg1(t, c), the utility function is bounded above by
ut,c(g1,m) ≤ A
g1,c
t,c n(t, c) + BNg1(t, c).
If this individual changes his behavior/group choice to g2, then by con-
struction of the worst lonely neighbors WNLg2(t, c), the utility function is
bounded below by
ut,c(g2,m) ≥ WNLg2(t, c).
Since
Ag1,ct,c n(t, c) + BNg1(t, c) < WNLg2(t, c),
we get
ut,c(g2,m) > ut,c(g1,m),
which is a contradiction.
The proof of case c) follows similarly to the proof of case a).
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4.3 Cave Psychological Model
Our cave psychological world is inspired in Plato´s concrete world, where all
things are shadows of the intelligible reality in Plato´s world of thoughts.
This world consists of individuals whose taste and crowding types follow
the shadows of the idealized taste and crowding types according to a given
probability distribution. Furthermore, the individuals know their welfare
function just in expected value.
Let n be equal to the cardinality #S of S. Let us denote the individuals
in S by s1, ..., sn. We represent by E the set of all external variables e and
we represent by I the set of all intermediate variables i. The values of
the external and intermediate variables determine the taste type t and the
crowding type c of the individuals sl, by a map tl× cl : E ×I → T ×C given
by
(e, i)→ (tl(e, i), cl(e, i)).
Let Vl : G×E×I → R be a map, where Vl(g, tl(el, il), cl(el, il)) measures
the satisfaction level that the individual sl, with external and intermediate
variables (el, il), has in choosing the behavior/group g. Let fl : (G × E ×
I)n → R be a map, where
fl(g1, ..., gn, tl(el, il); c1(e1, i1), ..., cn(en, in))
measures the satisfaction level that the individual sl has taking in account
the crowding types ck of the other individuals sk and their behavior/group
choices gk.
4.3 Cave Psychological Model 95
The welfare ul : (G × E × I)
n → R of the individual sl is given by the
utility function
ul(g1, ..., gn, e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in) =
Vl(gl, tl(el, il), cl(el, il)) + fl(g1, ..., gn, tl(el, il); c1(e1, i1), ..., cn(en, in)).
The shadow is the joint probability distribution P , of all the individuals
in S, with support contained in (E ×I)n, and Pl is the marginal probability
distribution, of the individual sl, with support contained in El × Il. Let
E(V, l, g) = EPl [Vl(g, tl(el, il), cl(el, il))]
and
E(f, l, g1, ..., gn) = EP [fl(g1, ...gn, tl(el, il); c1(e1, i1), ..., cn(en, in))] .
The expected utility E(ul) of an individual sl ∈ S is given by
E(ul) = E(Vl, l, g) + E(f, l, g1, ..., gn)
In this way, when the individuals pass from the intention to the behav-
ior/group decision, the indetermination of their types is solved arbitrarily,
for incidental reasons or reasons that the individuals are not able to pre-
dict except in probability. Another possible construction is presented in [3]
where the individuals know their own taste and crowding types, but ignore
the external and intermediate variables of the other individuals, except in
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probability.
The strategy G∗ : S → G is a (pure) Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium, if
given the choice options of all individuals, no individual feels motivated to
change his behavior/group choice, i.e. his expected utility does not increase
by changing his behavior/group decision (see Pinto [57]).
The cave idealized psychological model gives rise to a dictionary between
Game Theory and Theory of Planned Behavior that is summarized in Figure
4.3.
Figure 4.3: Theory of Planned Behavior / Cave Psychological Model
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4.3.1 Individuals that like to repeat the same behav-
ior (no-saturation)
In this section, we exploit situations where no-saturation can lead to the
adoption of a single consistent behavior decision.
A class F ⊂ S is cohesive, if for every sl, sk ∈ F we have
EP [uk(g1, ...gˆk, ..., gn, e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in)] > EP [ul(g1, ..., gn, e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in)],
for every (g1, ..., gn) ∈ G
n and gˆk = gl.
Lemma 4.3.1 Let G∗ be a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium. All the individuals
of a cohesive class F choose the same behavior/group G∗(F ) = G∗(sk), for
all sk ∈ F .
The proof of Lemma 4.3.1 follows similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.2.1.
When all the marginal probabilities Pl are Dirac masses and P is the
corresponding product measure, Lemma 4.2.1 is a sub-case of Lemma 4.3.1.
Remark 5 An interesting way to interpret the class F is to consider that
consists of a single individual sF ∈ S that has to take #F behavior/group
decisions. If Lemma 4.3.1 holds, the individual sF does not have a negative
reward by repeating the same behavior/group choice and so has a single
consistent behavior decision.
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4.3.2 Individuals that choose what they prefer
In this section, we exploit situations where individuals choose the behav-
ior/group that they prefer, independently of the influence of the others.
Let f+l : G× (E × I)
n → R be given by
f+l (g; e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in) =
max{(g1,...,gn)∈Gn:gl=g} {0, fl(g1, ..., gn, tl(el, il); c1(e1, i1), ..., cn(en, in))} .
Let f−l : G× (E × I)
n → R be given by
f−l (g; e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in) =
min{(g1,...,gn)∈Gn:gl=g} {0, fl(g1, ..., gn, tl(el, il); c1(e1, i1), ..., cn(en, in))} .
We define the shadow worst neighbors SWNg(l) of the individual sl that
chooses the behavior/group g by
SWNg(l) = E(V, l, g) + EP
[
f−l (g; e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in)
]
We define the shadow best neighbors SBNg(l) of the individual sl that
chooses the behavior/group g by
SBNg(l) = E(V, l, g) + EP
[
f+l (g; e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in)
]
Let gW (l) = argmax{g∈G} SWNg(l) and SBN(l) = max{g∈G:g 6=gW (l)} SBNg(l).
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Lemma 4.3.2 If SWNgW (l)(l) > SBN(l), then G
∗(sl) = gW for every
Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium G∗.
The proof follows similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.2.2.
The class F ⊂ S is gW cohesive, if, for every sl ∈ F , gW (l) = gW and
SWNgW (l) > SBN(l).
Corollary 4.3.1 If a class F is gW cohesive then G
∗(F ) = gW , for every
Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium G∗.
When all the marginal probabilities Pl are Dirac masses and P is the cor-
responding product measure, Lemma 4.2.2 is a sub-case of Corollary 4.3.1.
Remark 6 If Corollary 4.3.1 holds, considering that #F represents the
number of times that a individual sF has to take an action, one concludes
that the individual sF chooses the same behavior/group gW , independently
of the Nash Equilibrium behavior/group considered.
4.3.3 Boredom and Frustration
In this section, we exploit the situations where boredom and frustration can
lead to the adoption of a variety of different behavior decisions.
Let F ⊂ S and sl ∈ F . Let h
−
l : G× (E × I)
n → R be given by
h−l (g; e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in) =
min{(g1,...,gn)∈Gn:gl=g∧gk 6=g,∀sk∈F\{sl}} {0, fl(g1, ..., gn, tl(el, il); c1(e1, i1), ..., cn(en, in))} .
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We define the worst family lonely neighbors WNFg(l) of the individual
sl in choosing the behavior/group g by
WNFg(l) = E(V, l, g) + EP
[
h−l (g; e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in)
]
.
Let g1(l) = argmax{g∈G}WNFg(l) and g2(l) = argmax{g∈G:g 6=g1(l)}WNFg(l).
Let h+l : G× (E × I)
n → R be given by
h+l (g; e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in) =
max{(g1,...,gn)∈Gn:gk=g,∀sk∈F} {0, fl(g1, ..., gn, tl(el, il); c1(e1, i1), ..., cn(en, in))} .
We define the best family lonely neighbors BNFg(l) of the individual sl
in choosing the behavior/group g by
BNFg(l) = E(V, l, g) + EP
[
h+l (g; e1, ..., en, i1, ..., in)
]
.
Let SBN(l) = max{g∈G:g1(l) 6=g 6=g2(l)} SBNg(l).
The class F is (g1, g2) split, if, for every sl ∈ F , g1(l) = g1, g2(l) = g2,
SBN(l) < WNFg2(l) and BNFgi(l) < WNFgj(l), for every i, j ∈ {1, 2}
with i 6= j.
Lemma 4.3.3 Let F be a (g1, g2) split class. For every Bayesian-Nash
Equilibrium G∗, G∗(F ) ∩ g1 6= ∅ and G
∗(F ) ∩ g2 6= ∅.
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The proof of Lemma 4.3.3 follows similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.2.3.
When all the marginal probabilities Pl are Dirac masses and P is the
corresponding product measure, Lemma 4.2.3 is a sub-case of Lemma 4.3.3
Remark 7 If Lemma 4.3.3 holds, considering that #F represents the num-
ber of times that the individual sF has to take an action, one concludes that
the individual sF splits his decision, at least, between the behavior/groups
g1 and g2, independently of the pure Nash Equilibrium behavior/group con-
sidered.
4.4 Leadership in a Game Theoretical Model
A leader is an individual who can influence others to choose a certain group/
behavior. We consider that the leader makes his group/behavior choice be-
fore the others, and therefore the others already know the leader’s decision
before taking their behavior/group decision. We study how the choice of
the leader stl,cl can influence the followers stf ,cf to choose the same behav-
ior/group g as the leader, see [2, 3].
The leaders and the followers are characterized by the parameters (α,R, V, L)
and we distinguish the following types:
• Altruist and individualist leaders. The leader stl,cl values V > 0 the
behavior/group g and can donate a part (1 − R)V to the followers.
The parameter R determines the fraction (1 − R)V of the good V
donated from the leader to the followers. After the donation, the new
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valuation of the leader stl,cl for the group g is V
g
tl,cl
= RV . The altruist
leader is the one who distributes a valuation to the followers of the
behavior/group g, i.e. R < 1 and the individualist leader is the one
who gives a devaluation or debt to the followers of the behavior/group
g, i.e. R > 1.
• Consumption or wealth creation by the followers. We define α as the
parameter of the consumption or wealth creation on the valuation of
the good distributed by the leader to the followers. Therefore, the
new valuation of the followers stf ,cf to choose the behavior/group g is
given by
V g
tf ,cf
= V¯ g
tf ,cf
+
α(1−R)
n(tf , cf )
V,
where V¯ g
tf ,cf
corresponds to the previous valuation of the followers to
choose behavior/group g. There is wealth creation by the followers
when R < 1 and α > 1 or when R > 1 and 0 < α < 1. There is wealth
consumption by the followers when R < 1 and 0 < α < 1 or when
R > 1 and α > 1.
• Influent and persuasive leaders. The influence or persuasiveness of the
leaders stl,cl on the followers (t
f , cf ) is measured by the parameter L.
We consider that
Ag,c
l
tf ,cf
= L
corresponds to the satisfaction that the followers have by choosing
the same behavior/group as the leader. Alternatively, we consider
that Ag,c
l
tf ,cf
= 0 and that the followers have a new valuation V g
′
tf ,cf
=
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V g
′
tf ,cf
−L when they choose the behavior/group g′ ∈ G\{g} under the
influence of the leader. If L < 0, the followers do not like to choose
the same behavior/group as the leader, but if L > 0, the followers like
to choose the same behavior/group as the leader.
We define the leader worst neighbors LWNg(t
f , cf ) of the individual
stf ,cf in choosing the behavior/group g by:
LWNg(t
f , cf ) =


Ag,c
f
tf ,cf
+
∑
c′∈C,Ag,c
′
tf ,cf
<0
Ag,c
′
tf ,cf
∑
t′∈T
n(t′, c′) if Ag,c
f
tf ,cf
≥ 0
∑
c′∈C,Ag,c
′
tf ,cf
<0
Ag,c
′
tf ,cf
∑
t′∈T
n(t′, c′) if Ag,c
f
tf ,cf
< 0
We define the leader best neighbors LBNg(t
f , cf ) of the individual stf ,cf
by:
LBNg(t
f , cf ) =


∑
c′∈C,Ag,c
′
tf ,cf
>0
Ag,c
′
tf ,cf
∑
t′∈T
n(t′, c′) if Ag,c
f
tf ,cf
≥ 0
Ag,c
f
tf ,cf
+
∑
c′∈C,Ag,c
′
tf ,cf
>0
Ag,c
′
tf ,cf
∑
t′∈T
n(t′, c′) if Ag,c
f
tf ,cf
< 0
Let
gW = argmax
{g∈G}
LWNg(t
f , cf )
and
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LBN(tf , cf ) = max
{g∈G:g 6=gW }
LBNg(t
f , cf )
Lemma 4.4.1 Let the leader stl,cl choose the behavior/group g ∈ G. If
α(1−R)
n(tf , cf )
V + L > LBN(tf , cf )− LWNgW (t
f , cf )
then G∗(stf ,cf ) = gW , for every Nash equilibrium G
∗.
Inequality above gives a sufficient condition, in the value of the donation
(1− R)V , in the influence and persuasion L of the leader and, also, in the
creation or consumption of wealth α by the followers, implying that the
followers choose the same behavior/group as the leader.
Proof. Let us suppose, by contradiction, that G∗ is a Nash equilibrium,
such that, at least one follower stf ,cf chooses the behavior/group g ∈ G \
{gw}. By construction of the leader best neighbors LBN(t
f , cf ), the utility
function is bounded above by
utf ,cf (g,m) ≤ LBN(t
f , cf )
If the follower changes his behavior/group choice to gW , then by construc-
tion of the leaders worst neighbors LWNgw(t
f , cf ), the utility function is
bounded below by
utf ,cf (gw,m) ≥
α(1−R)
n(tf , cf )
V + L+ LWNgw(t
f , cf ).
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Since α(1−R)
n(tf ,cf )
V + L > LBN(tf , cf )− LWNgW (t
f , cf ), we get
utf ,cf (gW ,m) > utf ,cf (g,m),
which is a contradiction.
4.5 Game Theory in an Educational Context
In this example each student chooses a behavior/group. We consider two
different behavior/groups g ∈ {A,F} = G that correspond to results that
the students can have in the end of the academic year: A means that he
will approve and F means that he will fail, with some probability.
The students have preferences, over different behavior/group and over
the crowding profile of the other students in the same behavior/group, that
are described by the taste type. We consider a student community with
four taste types, t ∈ {tSW , tSN , tUW , tUN} = T , that can be defined by
considering two possibilities of different learning skills and previously sci-
entific knowledge obtained by the students, namely tSW , tSN , that corre-
spond to students with skills for success (S) and tUW , tUN correspond to
students without skills for success, that tend to be unsuccessful (U). The
taste types can also be defined by considering two possibilities of different
socializing behaviors, for instance, tSW , tUW (working-W), correspond to the
students that like to be with students that work/study more than average
and tSN , tUN (non-working-N), corresponds to the students that like to be
with students that work/study less than average.
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We consider that the choice of a behavior/group depends not only on the
characteristics of each student and their behavior/group valuation but also
on the characteristics of the other students that have chosen the same be-
havior/group. We refer these observable characteristics by crowding types.
In this example we consider four illustrative crowding types related with
the study frequency, namely c ∈ {CV , CF , CO, CR} = C. If a student has
a crowding type CV it means he studies very frequently, if a student has a
crowding type CF it means he studies frequently, if he has a CO crowding
type, he studies occasionally and with crowding type CR he rarely studies.
Overall, we can now consider four possibilities of different socializing
behaviors that we pass to describe: T = {tSW,CV , tSN,CO , tUW,CF , tUN,CR}.
Given the behavior/group g ∈ G, let us consider the crowding club
vector:
mg = {mgCV ,m
g
CF ,m
g
CO,m
g
CR}
where mgCV represents the number of students with crowding type CV that
choose the behavior/group g, mgCF represents the number of students with
crowding type CF that choose the behavior/group g, m
g
CO represents the
number of students with crowding type CO that choose the behavior/group
g, mgCR represents the number of students with crowding type CR that
choose the behavior/group g.
Let us now introduce the payoff of the four taste types in the model.
Students of type tSW,CV are students with skills for success that study more
than average. They also prefer to be with students that study very fre-
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quently.
utSW,CV (g,m
g) = V gtSW +m
g
CV , V
g
tSW
=

 VtSW if g = A0 if g = F
Students of type tSN,CO are students with skills for success that study less
than average. Furthermore, they prefer the company of students that study
occasionally or rarely.
utSN,CO (g,m
g) = V gtSN +m
g
CO +m
g
CR , V
g
tSN
=

 VtSN if g = A0 if g = F
Students of type tUW,CF are students without skills for success that study
more than average. Furthermore, they prefer the company of students that
study frequently or very frequently.
utUW,CF (g,m
g) = V gtUW +m
g
CF + (1 + α)m
g
CV , α > 0,
V gtUW =

 VtUW if g = F0 if g = A
Students of type tUN,CR prefer to be with a group of students without skills
that study less than average. Furthermore, they prefer the company of
students that rarely study.
utUN,CR (g,m
g) = V gtUN +m
g
CR , V
g
tUN
=

 VtUN if g = F0 if g = A
We can represent the utility function by
ut,c(g,m
g) = V gt,c +
∑
c′∈C
Ag,c
′
t,c m
g.
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The information concerning the satisfaction function is summarized in two
following tables: (A) a table of the behavior/group power V gt,c in the wel-
fare/payoff of each student taste type t and (B) a table of the crowding type
influence Ag,c
′
t,c in the welfare/ payoff of each student taste type t. For this
example the tables are described below:
A) The table of the behavior/group valuation in Figure 4.4 that shows
the welfare/profit of a student depending on his taste type:
Figure 4.4: Table of the behavior/group valuation
B) The table of the crowding type influence, in Figure 4.5 that shows
the positive or negative proportional effect of each crowding type for each
student depending on his taste type:
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Figure 4.5: Table of the crowding type influence
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The distribution of all students is characterized in the table of Figure 4.6,
where for each pair (t,c) we consider the corresponding number of students
n(t,c) :
Figure 4.6: Table of the distribution of all students
Given the utility function we can now determine the Nash equilibria. Study-
ing all the cases we obtain four different equilibria, as we pass to describe.
We will assume from now on that:
H1 : n(tUN) ≤ VUN
and
H2 : n(tSW ) ≤ VSW
and consider that S(t,c) represents the students s ∈ S with taste type t ∈ T
and crowding type c ∈ C.
Lemma 7: Under hypothesis H1 and H2, for every Nash Equilib-
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rium G∗, G∗(s) = F , for every s ∈ S(tUN ,cR) and G
∗(s) = A, for every
s ∈ S(tSW ,cV ).
Hence, from the Nash Equilibrium point of view, we have some students
with permanent choice of behavior/group, and we assume that the students
with taste type tUN and crowding type cR always choose behavior/group
F and students with taste type tSW and crowding type cV always choose
behavior/group A, under H1 and H2.
Lemma 8 (Students of types tUW and tSN prefer what they like) : If
n(tUN) < VtSN + n(tSN) and (1 + α)n(tSW ) < VtUW + n(tUW ) then there
is a Nash Equilibrium G∗ such that G∗(s) = A for every s ∈ S(tSN ,cO) and
G∗(s) = F for every s ∈ S(tUW ,cF ).
In this case (Figure 4.7) the determinating factor for students of type
tUW is the valuation of the behavior/group and not the members of the
behavior/group. For students of type tSN the determinating factor is also
the valuation of the behavior/group and not the members of the behav-
ior/group. Then the students of type tUW choosing behavior/group F and
the students of type tSN choosing behavior/group A form a Nash Equilib-
rium.
Lemma 9 (Students of type tSN prefer who they like): If n(tUN) +
n(tSN) > VtSN and (1 + α)n(tSW ) ≤ VtUW + n(tUW ) then there is a Nash
Equilibrium G∗ such that G∗(s) = F for every s ∈ S(tSN ,cO) and G
∗(s) = F
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Figure 4.7: Students of types tUW and tSN prefer what they like
for every s ∈ S(tUW ,cF ).
In this case (Figure 4.8) the determinating factor for students of type
tUW is the valuation of the behavior/group and not the members of the
behavior/group, but for students of type tSN the determinating factor are
the members of the behavior/group and not the valuation of the behav-
ior/group. Then the students of type tUW choosing behavior/group F and
the students of type tSN choosing behavior/group F form a Nash Equilib-
rium.
Lemma 10 (Students of type tUW prefer who they like): If n(tUN) <
VtSN + n(tSN) and (1 + α)n(tSW ) + n(tUW ) ≤ VtUW then there is a Nash
Equilibrium G∗ such that G∗(s) = A for every s ∈ S(tSN ,cO) and G
∗(s) = A
for every s ∈ S(tUW ,cF ).
In this case (Figure 4.9) the determinating factor for students of type
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Figure 4.8: Students of type tSN prefer who they like
tUW are the members of the behavior/group and not the valuation of the
behavior/group, but for students of type tSN the determinating factor is
the valuation of the behavior/group and not the members of the behav-
ior/group. Then the students of type tUW choosing behavior/group A and
the students of type tSN choosing behavior/group A form a Nash Equilib-
rium.
Figure 4.9: Students of type tUW prefer who they like
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Lemma 11 (Students of types tUW and tSN prefer who they like) If
n(tUN) + n(tSN) > VtSN and (1 + α)n(tSW ) + n(tUW ) ≤ VtUW then there
is a Nash Equilibrium G∗ such that G∗(s) = F for every s ∈ S(tSN ,cO) and
G∗(s) = A for every s ∈ S(tUW ,cF ).
In this case (Figure 4.10) the determinating factor for students of type
tUW are the members of the behavior/group and not the valuation of the
behavior/group, and the same happens for students of type tSN . Then the
students of type tUW choosing behavior/group A and the students of type
tSN choosing behavior/group F form a Nash Equilibrium.
Figure 4.10: Students of types tUW and tSN prefer who they like
Hence, we can have an “herding” effect in students of types tUW and
tSN as we pass to explain:
• Herding Effect in students of type tUW
Herding from F to A : Suppose that (1 + α)n(tSW ) ≤ n(tUW ) + V (tUW )
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Figure 4.11: Herding Effect in students of type tUW
and that tUW ⊂ F , a small increase in n(tSW ) and n(tUW ) or decrease in
valuation V (tUW ) can alter the above inequality to > leading tUW to change
as a herd his choice from behavior/group F to behavior/group A.
Herding from A to F : Suppose that (1 +α)n(tSW ) + n(tUW ) > V (tUW )
and that tUW ⊂ A, a small decrease in n(tSW ) and n(tUW ) or increase in
valuation V (tUW ) can alter de above inequality to < (less than) leading tUW
to change as a herd his choice from A behavior/group to behavior/group F.
• Herding Effect in students of type tSN
Figure 4.12: Herding Effect in students of type tSN
Herding from F to A : Suppose that n(tUN)+n(tSN) > V (tSN) and that
tSN ⊂ F , a small decrease in n(tSN) and n(tUN) or increase in valuation
V (tSN) can alter the above inequality to < leading tSN to change as a herd
his choice from behavior/group F to behavior/group A.
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Herding from A to F : Suppose that n(tUN) < n(tSN)+V (tSN) and that
tSN ⊂ A, a small increase in n(tSN) and n(tUN) or decrease in valuation
V (tSN) can alter the above inequality to > leading tSN to change as a herd
his choice from behavior/group A to behavior/group F.
4.6 Conclusion
We constructed two game models for the theory of Planned Behavior or
Reasoned Action. The first model, the platonic idealized psychological
model, consists of individuals with no uncertainties in their taste and crowd-
ing types and welfare function. The second model, the cave psychological
model, consists of individuals whose taste and crowding types follow the
shadows of the taste and crowding types of the platonic idealized psycho-
logical model, according to a given probability distribution. Furthermore,
the individuals know only the expected value of their welfare function. In
both models, we presented sufficient conditions for an individual or group
to adopt a certain behavior decision according to both the Nash and the
Bayesian-Nash Equilibria. We demonstrated how saturation, boredom and
frustration can lead to the adoption of a variety of different behavior deci-
sions and how no saturation can lead to the adoption of a single consistent
behavior decision. We studied how the characteristics of the leaders have
influence over other individual’s decisions. We presented a students suc-
cess model, described Nash equilibria and “herding” effects, identifying a
hysteresis in the process.
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